Thomistica

Hypostatic Distinction

 

It is critical, first, to understand what is proper to each hypostasis. To uphold divine simplicity, we must find a property extrinsic to essence to differentiate the persons so that divine essence remains perfectly one. For essence includes definition, intrinsic properties that make a thing what it is, informing it of its specific difference. The divine essence has one property: being without limitation, the preeminent infinitude of all things pertaining to being identical to one another essentially due to perfection. All things in God are God and are each other, possessed essentially and not by participation. Hypostasis is what is multiple. Hypostasis differs from essence in that it includes individuating principles. In matter, the different matter each substance possesses acts as an individuating principle. In angelic life, essence is an individuating principle because it differs. But if essence is identical, the multiple hypostases of the Formless Form are Themselves distinguished by individuation extrinsic to essence. Power, nor knowledge, nor any operation whether intrinsic or extrinsic belongs to hypostasis. Three questions must be posed to resolve this dilemma.

 

The first is: What property extrinsic to essence distinguishes the hypostases? Aquinas provides a compelling theory:

 

In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for "origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and "relation" by way of the form, as "paternity." (ST I, Q. 40, A. 2, co.)

 

His reasoning for distinguishing the persons by such a property is found in his proof that the relations can be the same as God’s essence while mutually opposing hypostases:

 

…in the [nine genera of accidents], apart from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality [for example], even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject [in this case hypostasis]; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is [essence], but from its respect to something outside [hypostasis]. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant" [mutually dependent] and not intrinsically affixed [inhering essentially], for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else [hypostasis]… (ST I, Q. 28, A. 2, co.)

 

Relation is the only thing considered thus far by theologians that can be used to distinguish the persons without scandalizing the purity of divine essence. 

 

The second question is: Now that the persons are distinguished, by what means do we constitute each, providing it with its hypostatic property or formality? Or in other words, though they all relate, how do their relations differ? The relations differ by order of production. Production establishes one hypostasis as principle, origin, or cause, all of which can be used interchangeably, and another hypostasis as terminus. The order in production is thus: Father, Son, Spirit. These productions happen both in eternity and essentially so that one is not subordinated to another either by chronological or ontological priority. It is evident then that the principle of production is the essence. For what is received by the Son from the Father is not fatherhood but the same divinity and what is received by the Spirit from the Father and Son is the essence that they already share, not fatherhood or sonship. Productive power is proper to essence not to hypostasis. For if productive power was proper to the hypostasis of the Father alone, then the Father would be essentially different. The Father is ascribed the hypostatic property of “paternity” because He is the principle of the Son, and consequently the Son is ascribed the hypostatic property of “filiation” because He is the terminus or product of the Father. These hypostatic properties are ascribed because the highest resemblance of this relationship in creation is found in the relationship between a father and his son. “Procession” is proper to the Spirit, and this expression “procession” falls short because it lacks any resemblance in creation. Though the manner of production, “spiration,” is suitable because the same two people can breathe (spirate) the same air, air being analogous to essence in this example from creation.

 

The third question follows from simplicity and can be broken into two parts. The first part: If the hypostases are their relations and the relations are the essence, the hypostases being three and the essence being one, at what point does three become one or one become three? If all of these are identical to each other, shouldn’t they all be three or all be one? Which then is prior logically, oneness or threeness? The key to this dilemma is the twofold sense in which relation can be regarded. It can be regarded in its nature as an accident in reference to its substance or in its nature as the specific kind of accident that it is. As an accident, it inheres in a substance, and as the specific kind of accident that it is, it has respect to something extrinsic to itself. We have already discussed what kind of accident it is (2) and concluded that relation enables mutual opposition between the hypostases. In that same article, Aquinas also considers relation as it inheres in a substance:

 

Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. (ST I, Q. 28, A. 2, co.)

 

It is necessary also to say that the Trinity is one before it is three. In logical order, hypostasis follows production. Essence, since it is the principle of production, is prior to relative opposition logically.

 

The second part: It seems that if there are three really distinct relations in God that God must be composed of three relations. How then can relations be identical to non-composite essence? The essence is both principle and terminus. Since the principle and terminus are identical, the relations, though distinct, do not form a composite of principle and terminus since they are one and the same essence. Moreover, each hypostasis finds identity in one and the same essence in an order, so that the separate relations do not differ in themselves but only relative to their opposing relations by virtue of order. Trinity is fitting in God for the sake of transcending the creatures bearing His likeness by His impartation of participation in being. Therefore, He must be preeminently order, mind, and distinction. The consequence of God possessing rationality or mind in a superior way is that production terminates (is perfected) after the Holy Spirit. The two mental operations found in creatures, intellect and volition, and the relations that result from the mutual opposition produced by these operations, mind, knowledge, and love, resemble God in an inferior way. By reason of nature, there is not following production to compliment what is necessary for the subsistence of a free, rational being. As the threeness is due to nature in creation, so must it also be due to nature and not hypostasis in God lest God be inferior to man. For if threeness was due to one hypostasis found within the three, then God would resemble man because in man mind precedes knowledge and knowledge precedes love. For you cannot love what you do not comprehend, and you cannot comprehend without a presence of self. And though these happen chronologically in man, they happen in eternal order in God but not differing as if they differed in essence.

 

Photius’ Error

 

A growing trend in Orthodox Christianity promulgates the idea that the filioque disrupts the monarchy of the Father by the Father’s relaying productive power or causality (“principleship”) to the Son. This originates from Photius’ Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit. This work is littered with insults which seem to take priority over good theology. Out of 96 paragraphs, the first 48 include over 40 sentences containing insults. The entire work is centered around one catastrophic philosophical error. Photius fails to understand what is proper to essence and what is proper to hypostasis. Individuating principles alone are proper to hypostasis. All else, including internal and external operations are specific to essence. Therefore, production is an essential property, not a hypostatic property, as discussed above (3). Power implies capability which is essential. And if we attribute power to hypostasis then the Father would have a power that the Son and the Spirit do not. The Spirit does indeed have this power by virtue of essence though no production occurs following the Spirit because threeness befits the essence. And that is the threshold of mystery which the power of the human mind will never cross: Why is God three? It makes sense that God is three so that the same image in us is found preeminently and more perfectly in Him. However, our image is after His, dependent on the tri-unity in Him. So, if the Father contains a power that the Son and the Spirit do not, is He Himself a hypostatic union or are the Son and Spirit together subordinate in essence? The difficulties that follow could be endless similar to how Photius’ objections were endless. Photius strawmans the latter position by claiming that we assert the Father and Son are distinct principles. But the essence is the principle, not the hypostases identical with the essence. The hypostases are together one principle by virtue of identicality with that essence. That the essence is principle is evident:

 

Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation [hypostasis] in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter. Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power of begetting… We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as [Aristotle] says, and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates, [not an individual man different than himself]. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him. (ST I, Q. 41, A. 5, co.) 

 

Aquinas even cites John of Damascus for proof:

 

But generation in Him is without beginning and everlasting, being the work of nature and producing out of His own essence, that the Begetter may not undergo change, and that He may not be God first and God last, nor receive any accession [acquisition of rank; monarchy]… (An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 1, Ch. 8; A.D. 740)

 

And Augustine suggests that they are one principle. But if they are one principle together, it cannot be by virtue of that in which they are distinct, paternity and filiation, but by virtue of that which they have in common, essence:

 

“And so when we say, both that the Father is the Beginning, and that the Son is the Beginning, we do not speak of two beginnings of the creature [i.e. creation in general]; since both the Father and the Son together is one beginning in respect to the creature, as one Creator, as one God. But if whatever remains within itself and produces or works anything is a beginning to that thing which it produces or works; then we cannot deny that the Holy Spirit also is rightly called the Beginning, since we do not separate Him from the appellation of Creator: and it is written of Him that He works; and assuredly, in working, He remains within Himself….But in their mutual relation to one another in the Trinity itself, if the begetter is a beginning in relation to that which he begets, the Father is a beginning in relation to the Son, because He begets Him; but whether the Father is also a beginning in relation to the Holy Spirit, since it is said, He proceeds from the Father, is no small question. Because, if it is so, He will not only be a beginning to that thing which He begets or makes, but also to that which He gives….If, therefore, that also which is given has him for a beginning by whom it is given, since it has received from no other source that which proceeds from him; it must be admitted that the Father and the Son are a Beginning [principle; principium] of the Holy Spirit, not two Beginnings [principle; principia]; but as the Father and Son are one God, and one Creator, and one Lord relatively to the creature, so are they one Beginning relatively to the Holy Spirit. But the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one Beginning in respect to the creature, as also one Creator and one God.” (On the Trinity, Bk. V, Ch. 13-14; A.D. 400)

 

While this one fix in Photius’ theology would correct all of his false accusations regarding two principles, Photius still holds an egregious double standard. We will use his own logic against him.

 

For if the Son and the Spirit came forth from the same cause, namely, the Father (even though the Spirit is by procession whilst the Son is by begetting); and if — as this blasphemy cries out — the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, then why not simply tear up the Word [Logos] and propagate the fable that the Spirit also produces the Son, thereby according the same equality of rank to each hypostasis by allowing each hypostasis to produce the other hypostasis? For if each hypostasis is in the other, then of necessity each is the cause and completion of the other. For reason demands equality for each hypostasis so that each hypostasis exchanges the grace of causality indistinguishably. (Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit, Par. 3)

 

While Photius here aims to prove that the Spirit should be attributed causality because what is proper cannot be attributed to any other and what is not proper to one is common to all, he exposes an error. Not only is cause not constitutive of the Father since the Father is not constitutive by power since it pertains to essence, but he evidently associates causality with rank. He thereby exposes that he believes the hypostasis of the Father ranks higher than the others. But rank is by virtue of the essence that they possess, not hypostasis. Otherwise, the Son being a cause of the Spirit would not demote the Spirit. And even if we were to associate causality with the Father alone, then the Son and Spirit have something in common that the Father does not. And if the Son and Spirit have in common that they are not from the Father, is the Father demoted or are they together demoted? And if you distinguish the formalities of the Son and the Spirit by the mode of their production, filiation and procession, what then is the difference between filiation and procession? Are these disparate modes of production? If so, is the Father then composed of the two principles resulting in the different terminating hypostases or are their two Fathers?

 

And again:

 

And you should also investigate the following argument: if the Son is begotten from the Father and the Spirit proceeds from the Son, by what reason do you not accord the Spirit, Who subsists in the same identical essence, the dignity of another procession from Himself to produce another hypostasis at the same time? Otherwise, you degrade Him Who is worthy of equal honour. (Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit, Par. 8)

 

Obviously, the Spirit does not need to produce to be equal since He has the same productive power by virtue of having the essence. Moreover, productive power is essential, but each person’s status as principle or terminus is relative to the other. The Spirit, therefore, because He does not produce actively, is not demoted since His inactivity as cause is due to His relative opposition to the Father and Son produced by common essence, not an essential difference. But Photius here again associates causality with nobility. For if the Son also lacks causality in respect to the Spirit, then the Son is equally demoted.

 

And again, Photius goes so far as to claim that the Holy Spirit is demoted in nature:

 

For truly, anything which is actually recognised as a proper characteristic of something when it is predicated of two other things, and it is truly asserted concerning one of the two but not concerning the other, the two are shown to be of a different nature… So, if this method is ever applicable and preserves the same sense, then if the procession of the Spirit is proclaimed to be a property of the Father, and this property is also asserted of the Son but not of the Spirit — such heretical wantonness! — then let what follows fall upon the heads of those who introduced such great evils, for thus far such slander was unthinkable. (Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit, Par. 17)

 

Photius is correct logically but this is erroneous because the Son and Spirit are also characterized by their relationships with each other and not only their relationship with the Father as caused. So, the Father is cause in a twofold sense, respective to both. The Son is terminus with respect to the Father and cause with respect to the Spirit. And the Spirit is terminus in a twofold sense, respective to both. They are characterized by a combination of these two, unless you subtract the mutual opposition between the Son and Spirit. But if you subtract their mutual opposition by virtue of relation, then you must admit that they are produced simultaneously from the same principle and in the same mode, which, if it were possible, would result in two Sons. And if you insert order into these two productions and suppose that the mode of production is the same then with the order is included mutual opposition since the order between Father and Son as cause to caused mutually opposes them. And if distinguished by mode in order, the consequences of distinguishing them by mode has already been described. The Father is then constituted by what He has that no other hypostasis has: paternity, since His relationship with the Spirit is common to the Son. The Son is constituted by filiation since His relationship with the Spirit is common to the Father. And the Spirit is constituted by procession since His relationship with the Father is common to the Son. 

 

In each hypostasis, the combination of their opposition to the other two hypostases which are not itself, does not form a composite of two relations, since, as discussed above (5), relation as an accident inherent in a substance is substantial in God, the twofold relations in each hypostasis are the same in substance, identical to one another, only different in respect to the hypostases which they are mutually opposed to, which is extrinsic to essence. Therefore, there is not essential composition from the two relations in each, but rather, twofold extrinsic opposition. In the absolute sense, God is one relationship exchanged in order and therefore in different respects.

 

Application in Scripture

 

I say with Hayden Newton that in the scriptures (John 16), it is indicated that the Spirit proceeds from the Son because He receives knowledge from the Son. Since knowledge is proper to essence and not hypostasis, it is clear that if the Spirit receives knowledge from the Son, then He must receive essence from the Son. Hayden presents the following syllogism in his work A Vindication of the Filioque, Par. 3:

 

1. All essential attributes of God (including knowledge) are possessed by each divine person according to their personal mode of origin.

2. The Holy Spirit possesses divine knowledge essentially and eternally.

3. Scripture reveals that the Holy Spirit receives and declares divine knowledge from the Son (John 16:13–15).

4. In God, reception of an essential attribute cannot be temporal, accidental, or external, but must signify an eternal relational origin.

5. Therefore, the Holy Spirit’s reception of divine knowledge from the Son signifies an eternal origin from the Son.

6. Therefore, the Son participates in the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit.

 

It may be objected that the Son is speaking here in His humanity. However, this cannot be so since the Spirit is receiving knowledge from the Son because the Spirit is prior to the Son’s humanity both chronologically and ontologically. Otherwise, it would be the Son, in his humanity, receiving knowledge from the Spirit. Unless the Spirit also participates in created reality in a temporal form, He cannot receive knowledge from the Son’s humanity. For the Spirit’s knowledge, though it may manifest in time, is from eternity. And if eternally from the Son’s divinity, then the Spirit contains the divine essence from the origin of the Son’s hypostasis. 

 

The only thing that remains is to verify that the Spirit receives knowledge from the Son:

 

When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine. For this reason I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you. (John 16:13-15)

 

The word “truth” implies being in the form of knowledge. Truth is essential to the divine. And truth must be that which Christ says is “mine.” When Christ says “mine,” He must be referring to something essential, whether that be truth, knowledge, or even effective external operation. If he is not referring to something essential when He says “mine” then it would have to be something hypostatic. But surely the Son is not giving a hypostatic property to the Spirit because that is repugnant to the Son’s formality. And that the Spirit receives is indicated by “will take what is mine.” The knowledge that is taken from the Son is eternal but is manifest by the Godhead through the Spirit in time. Moreover, the Son equates His mode of giving to the Spirit to the mode of His reception from the Father. He follows “he will take what is mine” with “all that the Father has is mine,” which is the essence and principle of production for the Spirit. The Son is acknowledged as an intermediate to the Spirit’s procession.

 

Not much needs to be said about scripture affirming that that Spirit proceeds from the Father (John 15:26). For obviously this does not negate procession from the Son. The two are not mutually exclusive as has been proven.

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Article by Matthew Shuler